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Publish Not Punish: The Contested Truth
of the South African Truth and
Reconciliation Commission
By Todd Landman
A review of After the TRC: Reflections on Truth and
Reconciliation in South Africa, Wilmot James and Linda van de
Vijver, Editors. Athens: Ohio University Press and Cape Town:
David Philip Publishers, 2000. 228pp.
and
Looking Back, Reaching Forward: Reflections on the Truth
and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa, Charles VillaVicencio and Wilhelm Verwoerd, Editors. Cape Town:
University of Cape Town Press and London: Zed Books, 2000.
322pp.

One of the most enduring images of the late 20th Century was the 1990 release of Nelson
Mandela from prison in South Africa. Former President F. W. De Klerk’s decision represented a
symbolic end to Apartheid, a form of governance based on racial exclusion and minority rule
enforced by the coercive apparatus of the South African state. More formally, the release of Mandela
ushered in a period of rapid democratic transition that saw the establishment of a multi-racial
Parliament, a new constitution, elections for all political offices, and the assumption of Mandela
himself to the Presidency. This rapid set of events should be seen as a significant part of a much
larger process of democratic transformation in South Africa, which includes large scale structural
changes, a prolonged and inclusive political struggle, a moment of transition, and a period of
democratic “habituation” during which the new democratic political institutions have begun to
function and the necessary supportive values and democratic political culture have begun to develop.
Most accounts of democratic transition focus on a limited and discrete moment of time during
which a political system changes from democratic to non-democratic rule, but as Rustow (1970)
reminds us, such a moment of transition represents only a small part of the struggle for democracy
over the longue durée.
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In the South African case, as well as many other transitional countries, the Truth and
Reconciliation Commission (TRC) should be seen as an important element within this larger process
of democratic transformation for three reasons. First, the TRC is an outcome of political negotiation
and strategy of accommodation between opposing political forces that characterized the moment of
transition. Second, it is a window on the past practices of both the regime and opposition groups
that seeks to establish a permanent record of truth about gross human rights violations. Third,
through its promise of reconciliation, it is a door on the future that allows a nation and a people to
move forward.
Despite these three positive aspects, however, the TRC is inherently problematic for a deeper set
of philosophical and epistemological reasons, since the whole process of truth telling, amnesty, and
reconciliation involves larger questions of the nature of “truth, causality, evidence, and explanation”
(After the TRC, p. 10). The TRC sought to answer a series of important questions: What happened?
When did it happen? Who did it? Why was it done? More importantly, however, is the question
about the status of the truth that is uncovered: how will the TRC know if its account is correct or
not? These deep problems of knowledge, facts, and explanation mean that the TRC’s existence,
official role, and eventual impact will remain highly political and contested by different elements in
South African society. Indeed, the many voices of dissent since the publication of its official findings
lend support to this notion of contestation. F. W. de Klerk sought to prevent the Commission from
publishing its findings, and the former National Intelligence Service (NIS) chief, Dr. Neil Barnard is
contesting virtually every finding of the TRC Report (Looking Back, Reaching Forward, p. 9).
These positive and problematic aspects of the TRC provide the content for the two books under
review, which include historical accounts, essays, and reflective pieces by key actors who took part in
the TRC, human rights activists and practitioners, academics, and other contributors. Looking Back
and Reaching Forward has 28 chapters divided into four parts: the historical context of the TRC, its
philosophical framework, its main aims and objectives, and its lessons for South Africa. After the
TRC has 22 chapters and is similarly divided into five parts: historical and comparative perspectives,
reflections on the nature of the TRC, unfinished business, lessons learned, and challenges for the
future. The contributors in each book include government ministers, representatives from NGOs,
former Commissioners of the TRC, members of the South African Parliament, judges, lawyers,
journalists, religious leaders, medical doctors, and academics. The academic contributions come
from a diverse set of disciplines, including history, economics, law, business, psychology,
physiotherapy, and theology. There is a mild overlap in the contributors, including essays in each
book from Richard Goldstone, Justice of the Constitutional Court of South Africa, Charles VillaVicencio, Executive Director of the Institute for Justice and Reconciliation and former Director of
Research at the TRC, and Mary Burton, former Commissioner of the TRC.
These books thus present a diverse set of views and arguments about the nature and impact of
the South African TRC. This review brings together the important contributions that these two
books make, and is organized into the following four sections: (1) technical aspects of the TRC, (2)
key themes of debate, (3) comparative inferences, and (4) implications and challenges of the TRC
for South Africa.

2
https://digitalcommons.du.edu/hrhw/vol1/iss3/1

2

Landman: Publish Not Punish

HUMAN RIGHTS & HUMAN WELFARE

Technical Aspects of the TRC
The TRC was set up by the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act (No 34) in
1995 as part of the Interim Constitution and therefore had a legal basis for its existence, while its
authority, legitimacy, and power were derived more through its practices. Its task was to establish an
official record of gross violations of human rights for the period between March 1960 and May
1994, identify the perpetrators responsible for committing them, and to prevent their recurrence in
the future (Looking Back, Reaching Forward, p. xix). Three main committees carried out the
activities of the TRC: the Amnesty Committee, The Human Rights Violations (HRV) Committee,
and the Reparations and Rehabilitations Committee. In addition, the Investigative Unit, in
collaboration with the Research Department, conducted investigative inquiries. The HRV
Committee was the predominant committee and received over 21,000 statements from victims, 80
percent of which were considered legitimate.
The Amnesty Committee (the second most important) effectively traded amnesty for truth.
Perpetrators confessed to their past actions and implicated themselves, but avoided direct
punishment. These two main components¾human rights and amnesty¾thus served as the
collective and complementary backbone of the TRC. But as Johnny De Lange, ANC Member of
Parliament observes, “the amnesty component derives its authority from the constitution, whereas
the human rights component claims its authority from our morality, from our humanity. The latter is
victim-driven, the former perpetrator-driven” (Looking Back, Reaching Forward, p. 24).
Key Themes of Debate
This division and tension between the two components of the TRC serve to frame different sets
of key debates surrounding the meaning, practices, and impact of the TRC that reverberate through
the essays presented in the two books. These debates are expressed as unresolved antagonisms
between principles, practices, or ideas. While not exhaustive, the list includes truth vs. reconciliation,
retribution vs. restoration, gross violations vs. politically motivated offences, just war vs. just means,
and the politics of memory vs. the politics of transition. Each of these antagonisms is considered in
turn.
Truth vs. Reconciliation
The strength of establishing a truth commission during a process of transition lies in advancing
reconciliation on a national or political level. As Priscilla Hayner observes, “By speaking openly and
publicly about past, silenced events, and by allowing an independent commission to clear up high
profile cases, a commission can ease some of the strains that may otherwise be present in national,
legislative, or other bodies” (Reaching Back, Looking Forward, p. 39). But establishing the truth may
not necessarily forge reconciliation as old and perhaps repressed memories are reinvigorated through
testimony. Political divisions and strong antagonisms can be re-ignited through the publication of
past abuses. Moreover, it is difficult for a national level institution such as the TRC to bring about
reconciliation at the individual level. In the South African case, the role of Archbishop Desmond
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Tutu, who opened each session of the TRC with a prayer, was to imbue the proceedings with a
religious tone that in many ways made individual reconciliation at least conceivable (Ibid., pp. 40-41).
Retribution vs. Restoration
A difficult area for any process of transition concerns the appropriate response to past injustices
and abusive practices. A gut instinct is to seek punishment for those responsible for wrongdoing.
This is the principle of retribution, and in the context of the history of human rights was carried out
most notably by the International Military Tribunal (IMT) in Nuremberg and more recently in the
International Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda and the Former Yugoslavia. For many reasons, the
TRC opted not to punish, but to publish. Since it was not a court of law, it did not determine
individual criminal liability nor did it order criminal sanctions against perpetrators. Even if it did, the
massive set of unresolved human rights abuses that had occurred over a period of 34 years would
have slowed the process significantly. Moreover, rules of evidence typically employed in criminal
courts tend to exclude information, while the TRC was keen to uncover as much information as
possible. In contrast to Nuremberg, the TRC was not established as the result of war, but
democratic transition. After the moment of transition, former agents of Apartheid were eligible for
electoral competition and formed part of the new human rights culture. Finally, in comparative
perspective, it is more the exception than the rule for such bodies to punish perpetrators (Looking
Back, Reaching Forward, pp. 28-31). Thus, the TRC was committed to a process of restoration
through truth, which precluded retributive justice. In this way, perpetrators confessed to the
Amnesty Committee, and victims gave testimony to the Human Rights Violation Committee, but
the two communities were not brought together, which leaves the question of restoration open.
Gross Violations vs. Politically Motivated Offences
Pinpointing the meaning of gross human rights violations presented the TRC with a serious
challenge, since many argued that the whole system of Apartheid was by its very nature a gross
violation, while others claimed the regime was simply one giant crime against humanity. The
legislation that created the TRC referred to killing, abduction, torture, and severe ill treatment.
Within the last category there were doubts as to the equal status of such violations as rape, solitary
confinement, mutilation, and poisoning on the one hand, and detention without trial, banning and
banishment, and the destruction of people’s houses on the other hand (Ibid., pp. 81-82). In the end,
the TRC took the view that all such practices constituted gross violations. But the issue was further
confused between those persons found by the HRV Committee to be victims of gross violations,
and those found by the Amnesty Committee to be victims of “politically motivated offences.”
Making such a distinction between gross violations and politically motivated offences had significant
ramifications for those who felt eligible for reparations (Looking Back, Reaching Forward, pp. 7879; After the TRC, pp. 137-138).
Just War vs. Just Means
The political struggle between the agents of Apartheid and the forces of opposition highlights
the problem of the distinction between just war, on the one hand, and just means within warfare on
the other. While agents of the Apartheid regime rationalised and justified their actions by claiming to
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be defending themselves against the forces of subversion, those opposed to the regime claimed a
moral position in their fight against an immoral regime. The TRC concluded that the forces of
opposition were clearly fighting for a just cause, and simply could not be equated morally with those
who sought to support and uphold the regime. Publicly, both sides of the conflict (broadly speaking)
spoke of upholding the principle jus in bello (just means), but in practice, the amnesty process and
truth telling illustrated that both sides privately believed virtually any means were legitimate. Indeed,
the TRC heard testimony from supporters of the regime as well as the ANC, who offered accounts
of detention, interrogation, torture, and execution within their own camps (Looking Back, Reaching
Forward, pp. 82-83).
Politics of Memory vs. Politics of Transition
The final theme that emerges in these two books is the tension between the politics of memory
and the politics of transition. The politics of memory involves the search for truth, but that very
truth is politically contested by agents on all sides of the conflict. Ebrihim Moosa observes, “The
truth was not measured but manufactured. To be charitable, we could say that the truth was
negotiated” (Looking Back, Reaching Forward, p. 116). Janet Cherry argues, “As a historian, I hold
that there is one reality, and that truth is not relative, it can be known. This does not make it easy to
find, nor does it mean that all will agree with the way it is interpreted or written by a particular
individual” (Ibid., p. 143). These two points of view demonstrate fundamental paradigmatic
differences, since Moosa argues that truth and memory are not universal or essential, but
constructed, while Cherry holds that one objective truth exists and can be known. The politics of
transition, on the other hand, requires all parties, in a sense, to forget the quest for truth in order to
move forward. At some point, to create the political compromises necessary for founding new
democratic institutions, parties should abandon the search for total truth, acknowledge the wrongs
of the past, and look toward the future. Taken together, the politics of memory shows that truth can
be subject to political manipulation, while the politics of transition shows how truth, however
defined, is part of a strategy of political accommodation.
Comparative Inferences
How do the experiences of the TRC compare to those in other parts of the world, and more
importantly, what are the important inferences that can be drawn from such comparisons? The TRC
in South Africa followed those that had been set up in Latin America, most notably Chile and
Uruguay. The TRC had a different mandate than those in Latin America, and the peculiar mix of
truth telling, amnesty, and reparations reflected a different philosophy about the purpose and
function of such a body. In Chile, for instance, the Rettig Commission merely identified as many
victims as possible, and published its report. All but a handful of military personnel escaped formal
prosecution. Moreover, in Latin America, no such amnesty for truth deals were available for the
perpetrators, although in the case of Argentina, some former officers of the military regime
eventually confessed to horrid practices that they committed while in power. In addition to these
technical and functional differences, there is a different nature to the political conflict under
authoritarianism in both these regions. In Latin America, the conflict was an ideological struggle
between left and right, while in South Africa, the conflict was defined in racial terms. As a
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consequence, Latin American authoritarian regimes targeted individuals for their subversive
activities, while Apartheid targeted whole communities.
Implications and Challenges
What was the final outcome of the TRC? Were its main objectives met? In After the TRC, the
positive assessments claim that the TRC’s investigations led toward approximations of truth and
built reconciliation. Less optimistic assessments argue that the TRC provided some truth but not
reconciliation. The more critical assessments argue that only a court of law can establish the truth,
while the policy of granting amnesty went too far. As Mandami argues, it freed whites and dominant
elites of the old regime of any responsibility for Apartheid, the structure and practices of which went
far beyond human rights violations (After the TRC, pp. 58-61). The key lesson thus far from the
experiences of the TRC in South Africa is that the full truth will never be established, only a
recognition and acknowledgement of past abuses. Both books argue that in order to move forward,
South African society must develop values of responsibility, accountability, and fairness. It must
develop respect for constitutionalism and the rule of law, abolish corruption, and establish a moral
culture. Most importantly, it must remain vigilant for any evidence of “sliding back” into previous
practices.
In order to realise such a challenging project of national reconstruction, restoration and
renovation, however, South Africa must address problems of extreme poverty and inequality that
persist to this day. Indeed, both books see direct links between poverty and participation. Poverty
excludes people, it denies them access to justice, and limits their ability for democratic participation.
Only through investment in education will the cycle of poverty be broken and real participation be
created. Both books see inexorable links between race, inequality, and the quality of democracy.
Unless all groups are provided with the economic opportunities of the new South Africa, the quality
of its democracy will always be subject to criticism. In the comprehensive treatment of many facets
of the overall process of truth and reconciliation, both books are clear in demonstrating that the
TRC was a bold experience that held a nation to account for past practices. And by being bold about
the truth, as Jeffrey Lever and Wilmot James observe, the TRC “provides us with the memories of
the unjust, and the values of the just …[which lay] … the foundations of the moral character of the
new South African” (After the TRC, p. 200).
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